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The Importance of Being Earnest:
Bankruptcy Disclosure Rules1
Robert Fishman, Honorable Judge John Henry Squires,
Steven Towbin, and Daniel Zazove
MR. FISHMAN: I got drafted at the last second to moderate this
panel because these gentlemen couldn't figure out how to divide their
time amicably. I don't have a Blackberry up here with me; it's my
watch. I don't want you to think I'm reading my email during this
program; it would be very rude.
The title of today's program is "The Importance of Being Earnest:
Bankruptcy Disclosure Rules," and some of the presentation is going
to be an effort to identify the obligations for disclosure, the circum-
stances and manner in which you do it. But another part of the discus-
sion I think is going to revolve around what does disclosure resolve
and what does disclosure fail to resolve.
There are certain parties I think who sometimes believe that if you
just tell everybody what the facts are, the problem which results from
those facts sometimes go away. One of the things the panelists are
going to talk about is, when will, while disclosure is appropriate, will it
not make the problem go away.
So the first thing we want to do is address why we're all gathered
here. We have a lot of duties related to disclosure rules in bankruptcy.
So gentlemen, when we talk about disclosure rules and obligations,
what exactly are we talking about? What do the parties need to un-
derstand about disclosure?
MR. TOWBIN: To put the disclosure rules into context, what we're
talking about is when a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 is filed and the
debtor in possession, the trustee, or the creditors' committee want to
retain counsel, and certain disclosure rules are required - that govern
what has to be disclosed to the other party in interest and most impor-
tantly, to the court and the U.S. Trustee. Those rules are set forth in
the material. Obviously we're not going to go through them in detail,
but the whole idea is the court and the parties of interest in the case
1. This is an edited version of the transcript from the third panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Into the Sunset: Bankruptcy as Scriptwriter of
the D6nouement of Financial Distress, held on April 16, 2009.
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have to understand what the "connections" are between the counsel
that's being chosen to represent the estate, either the trustee or the
debtor in possession or the creditors' committee and the other parties
in the case.
So it's number one, a disclosure of actual conflicts if there are any,
potential conflicts, and then things that perhaps the judge should be
aware of while the case is progressing.
MR. ZAZOVE: Why do we have those rules, and why are they in
the Bankruptcy Code at all?
MR. TOWBIN: You could really rely, if you wanted, on state rules
of conflicts of interest to a certain degree. But I think Congress has
taken the position in bankruptcy cases in particular because it's not
generally a plaintiff and a defendant, but multiple parties, and Con-
gress wants to make sure that a full and complete disclosure is made.
MR. ZAZOVE: Do they have any fiduciary obligations to act in
that capacity?
MR. TOWBIN: There's some debate about whether or not you
have fiduciary duties to creditors or to people other than your direct
client. So yes, I think most people take the position a Chapter 11
debtor's lawyer does have a fiduciary obligation at least to the estate.
MR. ZAZOVE: The trustee certainly does. So if you start with a
trustee and you take the word trust-
MR. TOWBIN: But who does your fiduciary duty really run to?
Does it run to the creditors? Does it run to the estate?
MR. ZAZOVE: But the estate is something where all the assets are
contained and parties of interest are participants in the estate. So if a
trustee is appointed for an estate or for a debtor, that trustee has fidu-
ciary obligations. Isn't that really the origin of all these rules and
provisions?
MR. TOWBIN: That's part of it, sure.
MR. ZAZOVE: So now instead of a trustee, a debtor stays in pos-
session. Does the debtor in possession occupy the same fiduciary
position?
MR. TOWBIN: I think there's a split of opinion about that. I think
there's clearly this concept that there's a fiduciary duty that runs from
a trustee to creditors of an estate, but I'm not sure that the same fidu-
ciary duty necessarily runs to creditors if you're representing a debtor
in possession. It clearly runs to your client.
MR. ZAZOVE: What about a committee counsel?
MR. TOWBIN: A committee counsel has fiduciary duties to the
committee as opposed to general unsecured creditors. The committee
[Vol. 7:627
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST
counsel does not represent general unsecured creditors per se individ-
ually. They represent them as a class. They really represent the com-
mittee. The communications between the committee and the
committee counsel would be privileged as opposed to communications
between creditors.
MR. ZAZOVE: But a committee occupies the fiduciary position in
the bankruptcy case.
MR. TOWBIN: To the unsecured creditor of that class.
MR. ZAZOVE: Or if it's an equity committee to the equity
committee.
MR. TOWBIN: That's right.
MR. ZAZOVE: So really the origin of all of these to say that
there's a person in a position of a fiduciary and we have to measure
that person's independence, loyalty, and ability to act on behalf of his
client or his constituency.
MR. TOWBIN: That's correct. No argument.
MR. ZAZOVE: If we trace the origin of bankruptcy back far
enough that there were only really trustee, Chapter 10s, and things
like those cases, and/or Chapter 7s or trustees, so really it comes
about; the origin of it really is the independence of a trustee who is
not beholden to one group or another and the professionals and the
trustee retained had to be as independent as the trustee.
MR. TOWBIN: But the - no. The trustee could be elected and
could be disinterested. Could be elected by the creditors and often-
times-
MR. ZAZOVE: Are you saying that you could elect a non-disinter-
ested trustee?
MR. TOWBIN: You absolutely could and as a matter of fact, peo-
ple do it all time, and used to do it more often. So that's you know, so
interesting obviously a debtor in possession is not disinterested in any
way. So they're-
MR. FISHMAN: They have fiduciary duties even if you're not
disinterested.
MR. TOWBIN: They have fiduciary duties, but the individual who
is the officer of the corporation or the general partner of the partner-
ship, their fiduciary duty runs to the entity; it does not run to the
creditors.
MR. FISHMAN: Let's focus this discussion a little bit because the
debate about what kind of fiduciary duty a debtor in possession's
counsel has or does not have to an estate is an interesting topic, but
we're not going to resolve it this afternoon.
20091
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In the context of why we are making these disclosures, there's rules
that require disclosures, but give us the context in which the disclo-
sures are being presented, who is looking at them, and what are they
being asked to do when they see them. Dan?
MR. ZAZOVE: They're obviously in connection with retentions of
professionals or parties who have a responsibility to carry out these
duties in a bankruptcy case. In order to determine the relative depen-
dence or independence of anyone who might be retained we hold up
their compensation. You know, I often wonder whether or not you're
going to have a completely interested and non-independent person as
long as they never sought to be compensated from the estate. Doesn't
sound like a good idea, but putting that aside, we're saying, "Look,
you want to get paid." We hold the purse and if you want to work for
one of these fiduciary parties or in the estate, then we're going to
measure your relative dependence or independence. We do that with
you disclosing and having everybody else have a shot at determining
whether or not you're dependent or independent.
MR. FISHMAN: So we've done this disclosure under Rule 2014.2
Who exactly do we need to satisfy with this disclosure? Judge, would
you like to address that question?
JUDGE SQUIRES: I'm the one that has to sign the order approv-
ing the retention and pass on any objections thereto. In addition, to
the points that Dan and Steve made, part of the process is to make it
transparent which is very important for legitimizing the entire bank-
ruptcy process.
Previously, under the Act, when referees were appointed by the dis-
trict judge as political appointees, things were done behind closed
doors and the disclosure requirements were not what they are now.
There was a perception in this area and other areas that bankruptcy
rings, which the disclosure rules are in part intended to dissipate and
make the whole proceeding spread of record with certain things that
have to be publicly disclosed. And that's an important policy consid-
eration underlying this disclosure requirement. After all, the estate is
being administered as a trust estate and if you want to get paid, gener-
ally out of the estate as a professional person, you have to be retained
under Section 327,3 you have to make the disclosures required under
Rule 20144 and what is it 5002,5 have a hearing on a notice to the
appropriate parties and that's the condition precedent as far as getting
2. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2008).
4. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
5. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5002.
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paid, especially in the Seventh Circuit after one case that I was inti-
mately familiar with, the Grabill6 decision.
MR. ZAZOVE: You're raising a good point that everybody gets a
shot at objecting to the independence of any of the professionals.
MR. TOWBIN: Who gets notice of these applications? It certainly
isn't every creditor in the case.
MR. ZAZOVE: I guess that's right.
MR. TOWBIN: So it's anybody who is really anybody?
MR. ZAZOVE: Just the important people. First of all, you have to
rely to a certain extent that parties in interest are filing appearances
and requesting them. You're certainly serving them upon your largest
creditors, the United States Trustee. In fact, under the new rules you
can present your application, but you can't get an order authorizing
the retention.
MR. TOWBIN: That's an important thing. The rules have basically
been changed to require at least a twenty-day period after an order
for relief of a petition to be employed to be entertained by the court
unless it's going to cause irreparable harm. I've yet to see a judge
think that not entering an order employing a professional is going to
have irreparable harm kinds of consequences.
But that rule was changed because obviously on the first day of
most Chapter 11 cases, the judge has a stack of motions and all the
parties in interest have motions their interested in. Congress in its
infinite wisdom decided that they're going to change the rules a little
bit and make sure some of the things such as retention of profession-
als is going to be delayed past the first day.
Now, I have seen cases where interim orders authorizing a retention
have been entered. I don't think that's what the rules really intended
and I think those interim orders were entered for the purpose of pro-
tecting the right to be paid if subsequently it turns out there are pro-
fessionals not disinterested and cannot be employed.
MR. FISHMAN: Do we think that works? If you're not disinter-
ested or are ultimately determined to be not disinterested, do you
think having an interim order entered somehow preserves your right
to be paid, or is it something of a hollow gesture to get that interim
order?
MR. TOWBIN: I can't speak for other circuits, but certainly in the
Seventh Circuit the rule is very clear. Judge Squires indicated in the
GrabilP case and others if you are not disinterested, it's not going to
6. Matter of Grabill Corp., 983 F.2d 773 (111.1993).
7. Id.
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632 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
help you to have an order that appointed you on less than full notice
or less than full consideration in the Seventh Circuit. As a matter of
fact, it might work against you given opinions that we've seen lately
from the Seventh Circuit.
So I would say that kind of order is not necessarily going to help
you. Now, there's a certain amount of leeway and discretion I think
that courts have in determining who is disinterested, who is not disin-
terested, and we can get to those cases. As a matter of fact, I don't
know if you've taken a look at the materials, but at the end of the
materials there's a recent set of case papers that were filed by a firm in
Madison, Wisconsin. An objection that was filed by the U.S. Trustee
and that was a very interesting process as to how that got worked out
and hopefully we'll have some time to talk about that. But it's not as
clear-cut on these rules about conflicts and who is disinterested and
who is not. So I think that there is some leeway. I haven't seen in-
terim orders in our court in Chicago.
MR. FISHMAN: Judge, has anyone asked you to enter an order
like that yet?
JUDGE SQUIRES: No, and I wouldn't do it. The important thing
is to get your application on file and then you can notice it up for
hearing twenty days out or whatever if you're worried about getting
paid. The main thing is just getting the application on file and follow
the rules.
MR. FISHMAN: I was involved in a recent case in the Northern
District of Florida where they did enter an interim order the first time
we appeared in court. It wasn't to retain me so I was not that con-
cerned with its effectiveness or exactly why we were doing it. But
counsel for the debtor in possession in that case believed it very im-
portant to get that interim order entered because he believed it was of
value to him with respect to compensation he might earn during that
interim period.
I don't know the difference in the status of the law in the Eleventh
Circuit as opposed to the Seventh Circuit, but in the Seventh Circuit I
don't think that interim order would be of much value if you ulti-
mately are not found to be disinterested.
MR. ZAZOVE: I'd just pose a question to Judge Squires here.
Suppose somebody did file an application day one and it turned out
they had a disqualifying conflict. Could you not enter an order au-
thorizing their retention as special counsel for that interim period so
they could at least be compensated for the work they did?
JUDGE SQUIRES: That's a possibility. You know, all these things
are incredibly fact intensive and I wish practitioners would remember
[Vol. 7:627
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when these cases hit the court's docket, generally me and my col-
leagues don't have the foggiest idea who the debtor is. We may know
some of the lawyers and other professionals who would be in the case.
We don't know anything about it. Especially in Chapter 11, where
one of the first day motions is frequently a motion for extension of
time to file schedules and statement of financial affairs and all the
other paperwork. We don't have a clue as to what the estate consists
of, what the problems are. And we realize that you as practitioners
may be in a steep learning curve trying to find out what's going on, but
we are at the end of the information pipeline, at least at the trial court
level. So bear with us. And you know, we'll try to do the right thing,
but you have to understand your audience. And on matters in the
bankruptcy court generally the judge assigned the case is your main
audience, so bear in mind that we don't have the same perspective and
background information that you ever will. There's no way I am ever
likely going to know the intricacies of the case in front of me and
that's because I only see the tip of the litigation iceberg that surfaces
in bankruptcy court. I'm not privy to any of the out of court negotia-
tions and contacts et cetera, et cetera, unless and until it comes up
during the course of discovery or trial on a contested matter or adver-
sary proceeding. I don't really want to know all of that stuff. I'm just
trying to sort through the matter of your case which is one of, on my
docket, of about 4,000 other active pending cases.
So you have to keep that in mind and especially in 11s, don't expect
the court to be as promptly deciding all this stuff as perhaps you
would like. It would be preferred if you'd get everything on file you
have to and then stage it out for what's really important early on, that
maybe critical other than in the Seventh Circuit, critical to your mo-
tions. But just bear in mind we've got dockets to manage and we are,
as I said, at the end of the information pipeline. So you know, take
your time and try and do it right the first time.
MR. FISHMAN: So here we are ready to get retained. We're go-
ing to file a motion whether you're representing a committee, a trus-
tee, or a debtor in possession, you are a professional and along the
way someone can take a shot at defining what is included in the con-
cept of professional.
But we file this application and it implicates Rule 2014,8 which I'll,
one of you who happens to have the rule in front of you can read it so
the audience can hear the words, and the word to focus on in Rule
8. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
2009]
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20149 is the word connection. So the next part of the discussion that
I'd like us really to focus on is what exactly is a connection?
JUDGE SQUIRES: As luck would have it, this is another one of
those interesting words that's not a defined term. It's Section 101.10
MR. FISHMAN: Can I take connection for 200?
JUDGE SQUIRES: Is that your billing rate?
MR. FISHMAN: Now.
JUDGE SQUIRES: My response to the question is you tell me. I
don't know anything about connections, but most of the 201411 appli-
cations I see are pretty much vanilla. They're garden variety and we
see them mostly in 7s, but we occasionally see them in the 11s. Where
it just says Mr. or Miss X is the applicant here for whatever the posi-
tion is as a professional person and we are, I'm statutorily disinter-
ested and I'm not representing an interest adverse to the estate. So
appoint me. That's basically what it says.
MR. ZAZOVE: I think we could talk about some things that we
would generally all agree are connections. First of all, if you ever rep-
resented the debtor before, that would be a connection. The debtor's
officers or directors, its subsidiaries and affiliates, certainly its secured
creditors, lenders, and its twenty largest unsecured creditors because
you're likely going to have some further interaction with them. An-
other connection is if there are critical contracts. I think an interesting
case was The Tribune representation where the investment banker,
who shall remain nameless, was seeking to be retained and failed to
disclose they represented The Tribune's largest competitor, the Sun-
Times. I don't know whether it was successful or not, but an objection
was lodged on the grounds it created an irreconcilable conflict for the
investment banker.
MR. FISHMAN: Let me interrupt for a minute to further focus us
in this discussion. In the many contexts of discussions that come up
about the disclosures that are made in conjunction with retention,
people will confuse the two terms connections and conflicts. Often
the terms will be used interchangeably, but they are not the same
things, don't mean the same things, and don't have the same
consequences.
So when we're talking about one or the other, let's try to be specific.
In my opinion at least, a connection is merely the identification of a
relationship with something or someone that is embodied within Rule
9. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2008).
11. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
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2014.12 While a conflict is governed by the rules of professional con-
duct. A connection may or may not be a conflict, while I suppose it's
possible a conflict might not be a connection, they probably all are.
So as we're talking about connections and conflicts, let's use the words
with some exactness.
MR. TOWBIN: Here's an example that came up in a case, as far as
a connection. The counsel for the creditors' committee in a relatively
small case was going to be required to take on the secured creditor. It
turns out the secured creditor in that case had a lien on all the
debtor's assets and was the major financing provider to that lawyer's
law firm. Should that have been disclosed or not? Was that a connec-
tion the secured creditor, because they held the purse strings to the
law firm's finances, could use to put pressure on the lawyer to basi-
cally take a pass at challenging his lien? It was an issue that came up.
It was ultimately disclosed.
I happened to represent a party in interest there and didn't file
something with the court. I basically took the lawyer aside and I said,
"Hey, don't you think that maybe this is an important connection that
you ought to be disclosing to people?" Sure enough, ultimately upon
the threat I would file if they didn't, they did file it and it turned out
that the judge in that particular case didn't think it was a disqualifying
conflict of interest.
MR. FISHMAN: Do you think that's a conflict of interest at all?
MR. TOWBIN: To me it bordered on a conflict of interest. It was a
potential conflict and there are issues about whether or not you could
be disqualified because of a potential conflict or if it has to be an ac-
tual conflict. I think courts have moved away from disqualifying peo-
ple or not approving their retention because of potential conflicts and
now require an actual conflict.
But I think that's something at the very least that has to be dis-
closed. If I was an unsecured creditor I would want to know the law-
yer representing my interests didn't hold its livelihood or ability to pay
its employees hostage to a secured creditor who they were going to
attack. Is it a conflict? I don't know.
MR. ZAZOVE: Certainly it's a connection.
MR. FISHMAN: And that's the distinction I'm trying to draw.
There's no doubt it's a connection and maybe one of you guys can
read the pertinent language for 201413 for anyone who is not expressly
familiar with it.
12. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
13. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
2009]
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MR. TOWBIN: Unfortunately, the sentence is rather lengthy. It
says this is an application to be employed only for professionals re-
tained under 1103,14 1114,15 or 327,16 and the standards for committee
counsel, 3278,17 and counsel for debtors or trustees really are differ-
ent; and we'll talk about that in a minute. But 2014 says, "The appli-
cation shall state the specific facts showing the necessity for the
employment, the name of the person to be employed, the reasons for
the selection" - somewhat interesting - "the professional services to
be rendered, any proposed arrangement for compensation and to the
best of the applicant's knowledge all of the person's connections with
the debtor, creditors and other parties in interest" - other parties in
interest is a pretty broad term - "their respective attorneys and ac-
countants, the United States Trustee or any person employed in the
office of the United States Trustee." 8
So you've got some terms there between connections and parties in
interest. By the way, do you know everybody who works in the U.S.
Trustee's office and who their relatives are, because I sure don't? But
that's how broad this is supposed to be. I guess the best rule of thumb
is if you think it ought to be disclosed, if there's a question at all,
disclose it.
MR. FISHMAN: Probably one of the takeaways from this is if you
have to ask yourself whether it should be disclosed, it should be dis-
closed because if it's not obvious to you that it doesn't fit within the
gamut of the word connection under rule 2014,19 then it arguably does
and you're only jeopardizing yourself if you're not including it.
Now, in big cases and in big firms it's interesting to see what they do
with this stuff sometimes. One of the things that I started to do, most
recently today when an email went around our office that General
Growth happened to file its bankruptcy today, which you may or may
not know, in the Southern District of New York. Somebody called us
to represent a client in that case and sent an email around and I dis-
closed in response to the email, which is part of how we do our con-
nection and conflict search, that I'm a shareholder of General Growth
Corporation. Too bad for me. I'm not sure that's a good thing to do
to be a shareholder of a debtor.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (2008).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (2008).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2008).
17. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3278.
18. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
19. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
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In any event, it's a connection. We represent a client and I am a
shareholder of the adverse party. I'm a shareholder of 100 shares or
something so who cares, but that starts to highlight the kinds of things
that may constitute connections that I think don't ever even remotely
rise to the level of a conflict of interest. But depending on how you
read that rule and what depth you think it requires you to go, you may
have to disclose connections.
MR. TOWBIN: By the way, in cases where there's publicly held
debtors and counsel for the debtor in possession and members of the
firm own stock, I have seen orders where the stock has been required
to be sold even though it's a minimal amount of stock. Nevertheless,
you know the court in those cases feels there's an apparent conflict. I
mean, to me requiring that and letting some other stuff go is hard to
reconcile, but nevertheless, courts have different views of different
types of connections and what's required to cure them.
Another interesting issue is if you are not disinterested, can you
cure it? We have seen more and more cases where conflict counsel is
being retained by Chapter 11 debtors and Chapter 11 committees.
What you're saying when you file a motion to retain conflict counsel is
I'm not disinterested. I don't qualify under 32720 and here's how I'm
going to solve that problem. The statute doesn't say you have to be
disinterested, but if you're not, you can get a fix. It says you have to
be disinterested.
But when you have a case like Enron21 or United22 or you have a
case of that scope - and wait till you see General Motors if it files
and the conflicts there - what do you do as a practical matter. What
can a judge really do in a situation where a debtor has invested hun-
dreds of thousands or millions of dollars in professional fees in a firm,
they need that firm to represent them and they're presented with a
potential conflict.
JUDGE SQUIRES: It happened to me in the Clark Retail23 case.
My solution to that problem because I knew exactly what Steve's
point was, I ordered a Chinese Wall to be erected. There was an ob-
jection by the UST and I think maybe one other creditor about com-
plicated connections that could pose a potential conflict. But case law
out there that allowed this to be done and I thought that was the ap-
propriate way to exercise what equitable discretion I had. I required
20. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2008).
21. In re Enron Corp., 279 B.R. 695 (Bankr S.D.N.Y.2002).
22. In re United Airlines, 438 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2006).
23. Clark Retail Group, Inc. v. Clark Retail Enter., Inc. (In re Clark Retail Enter., Inc.), 308
B.R. 869 (Bankr.N.D.ll.2004).
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in that case that the individuals who were in the firms for the debtor in
possession who had done work for whatever this entity was, be
screened off from all communication, all correspondence, all emails,
et cetera, et cetera. I even required one of the firm members, the
eminent and now, I guess retired, scholar, George Treastor, to act as
the firm ombudsman and file periodic records with the court on
whether the Chinese Wall had been maintained in order to avoid the
appearance of impropriety.
Everybody seemed happy with that, or relatively happy and no ap-
peal was filed. The case was, as those cases go I guess, relatively suc-
cessful. But it would have been a huge mess on the front end of a
major mega case to have that firm out of L.A. disqualified for consid-
ering how much money had been invested in getting the case to court
and ready to hopefully get on track.
MR. FISHMAN: Let's focus on - we talked about the kind of
disclosures that might need to be made in regard to connections. Dan,
let's turn to you. You can use Perkins Coie as a starting example. Go
wherever your thoughts take you. Judge, I would particularly like to
have you share with us what you've seen from other firms - you
don't have to name firms, but other examples of methodologies. How
do you go about figuring out what connections a firm has to who, what
method do you use, what communications do you make and where do
you draw the line is worth mentioning.
MR. ZAZOVE: Bob's raising some very good questions and it cer-
tainly has to vary on a case-by-case basis. In the first instance, I guess
you really want to know whether or not your potential client is pub-
licly held or privately held. If it's publicly held, hell will be rained on
your partners because you'll have to ask every one of them whether or
not they're stockholders. We also send this around to every single
employee of the firm and require them to disclose if they have any
share holdings in the prospective client and of course, it has to be
done on a very confidential basis as well because you don't want any
information that the potential client may file to leak.
Beyond that, we maintain an incredibly large database of all of our
present and former clients; even those who are no longer our clients
and have not been. But even then how far back do you go? We go
back and look at something from the last five years and see if we ha-
ven't represented somebody during that time. We generally disclose it,
but it will be at the option of the person who is preparing the affidavit.
MR. TOWBIN: I have a question. Does your firm have a policy
about sending out termination of engagements when you're done with
[Vol. 7:627
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an engagement? How do you know when an engagement is over? Do
they stop paying the bill?
MR. ZAZOVE: That's one way certainly. But you're right, Steve.
Sometimes you do send a letter out terminating the engagement while
sometimes you just close the file because you realize the matter in
which you were working on has been concluded with no formal termi-
nation. You might terminate the matter, but then the question is have
you terminated the client relationship which is another issue entirely.
You have to look at both of those things.
MR. TOWBIN: I have seen clients say, "Well, you didn't represent
me in the last year, but we are a client of the firm." I've also seen
financial institutions do this to lawyers and disqualify them on that
basis because they don't want to see them represent the debtor in the
case.
MR. ZAZOVE: One of the things that we do is we're pretty care-
ful about our engagement letters, which is not always possible to do,
but certainly for one-shot type relationships or engagements, we're
pretty careful. Say we're being engaged in this specific matter and this
doesn't extend to any other matter unless both of us agree that we
shall represent you in these other matters. It doesn't extend to your
affiliates or your parents or subsidiaries or your officers and directors
you know, without some specific agreement in writing that it shall.
So you know, I cannot tell you, Steve, that there aren't situations
where someone wants to file a case, you run a conflicts check and it
comes back revealing somebody's got a matter that hasn't been active
for five years or more. You call that lawyer and say, "Why is this case
still open?" "Why is this client still open?" Sometimes it's because
the lawyer who was involved doesn't want to close the relationship
and is trying to hang onto something even though there may not be a
relationship there anymore.
MR. TOWBIN: Is it your practice to file a copy of your retention
letter with your application?
MR. ZAZOVE: It depends on the circumstances. There are two
circumstances where I do file: one, is if there is any kind of a waived
conflict of some kind where you may have represented a party who
may be adverse, not in connection with this case but with something
else. But that's because the represented party thinks the court has to
judge the type of waiver that you're getting and so you do file a copy
of the retention letter with the application.
MR. TOWBIN: So in other words, if you get a retention that says
you can go ahead perhaps from a financial institution that says you
can go ahead and represent this debtor and negotiate the debtor in
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possession financing arrangement. You will never take an adverse ac-
tion against the bank or sue the bank in any way because that's some-
thing that's disclosed or should it be disclosed?
MR. ZAZOVE: It definitely has to be. I don't think there's any
question. We get prospective waivers from most of our clients and
what our standard engagement letter says is, "Look, I cannot tell you
what will happen in the future. It may be that during the time that
we're representing you, we might represent someone who has an ad-
versity to you but not in connection with anything we're representing
you on." The clients agree to us asking them to agree up front that as
long as there is not an actual conflict, we can continue to represent the
adverse party in matters unrelated to you and will ask the same of that
party as well.
If it turns out that there is such an adversity, I will generally disclose
it in the engagement letter and file and attach a copy of the letter to
my application.
The circumstance that you're talking about is a bit more tricky.
That's where representing an institutional lender, maybe not in con-
nection with this case but someone in one of your other offices, and
you may have to get a specific conflict waiver from that institution. In
that case, you not only have to file a copy of your engagement letter,
but you better file a copy of your conflict waiver with it as well.
AUDIENCE: I just want to go back to the point you made earlier
about opening discrete matters. I've seen a lot of large law firms pro
forma open a general matter for almost every client and then open
specific matters. It would seem that if you do any billing under a gen-
eral matter, then you really have to research what work you were do-
ing specifically and that could be quite a broad variety of work.
MR. ZAZOVE: Sure. What we tend to do is open one matter for
that client. It starts with matter one, and then if somebody calls and
says, during the time you're representing them, I have a question that
I wanted to ask you and you want to bill the client for that time, you
might get it in a general category even though you have fifteen or
twenty, we represent, we do a lot of work for Weyerhaeuser Realty.
We have forty-seven matters open for them, but I'll tell you half the
time they call me and say, "I just have a general question and I want
you to bill me for it." Okay.
MR. FISHMAN: Let me add something to that because I think I
have certainly seen in the last couple of years in conjunction with our
applications to renew malpractice insurance that malpractice insurers
are getting a lot savvier on account of all of the conflict problems that
they are finding landing in their lap. For instance, our malpractice
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insurer has given us discounts for our agreement to use an engage-
ment letter for every matter for every client. Our malpractice insurer
also gave us a discount for agreeing to use termination letters to ter-
minate engagements. We also, like Dan, have I think a very sophisti-
cated engagement letter that delineates who we're representing, who
we're not representing, and what the matter is, what the matter isn't,
and it talks about what we can do with files after a certain period of
time.
There's a lot of loose ends and I think actually the malpractice carri-
ers are assisting law firms in developing systems that are helpful to
meet the requirements. In our particular case we've actually gotten
discounts on our insurance because we've agreed to adhere to a more
difficult set of rules than we used to follow say four or five years ago.
MR. ZAZOVE: I was going to ask Judge Squires what his view is
of how many creditors you have to search. Certainly I think there's a
consensus amongst most people that you really have to search the 20
largest creditors. But some law firms literally search every single cred-
itor in a case and that could be very burdensome.
JUDGE SQUIRES: Unfortunately, Rule 2014(a) 24 doesn't limit it
to 20; it just says creditors. So, it's problematic and I hasten to remind
you the last sentence of Rule 2014(a)25 requires it to be a verified
statement. Steve & Barry is a citation to United States v. Gellene26
with which I hope you all become familiar with. The case has been
described as the perfect storm for inadvertent perhaps, but materially
omitted 2014(a)27 disclosures that went as far as you can go. It didn't
result in just loss of fees, but also in criminal prosecution up in
Milwaukee.
MR. FISHMAN: Jail time.
JUDGE SQUIRES: The whole nine yards. So it's serious. There's
a book out that I would highly recommend everybody read, which has
a real catchy title that caught my interest. It's called Eat What You
Kill.28 The author's surname escapes me, but it's now out in paper-
back. It was published in 2004 at the University of Michigan and it is
a very detailed story of the Bucyrus-Erie bankruptcy up in Milwaukee
that gave rise to Mr. Gellene's criminal prosecution after he'd done a
very credible job of representing the debtor and debtor in possession.
24. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a).
25. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a).
26. United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578 (7th Cir.1999).
27. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a).
28. MILTON C. REGAN, JR. EAT WHAT You KILL, (U. Mich. Press 2004).
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After I read the book, I called my friend and now retired colleague,
Russ Eisenberg, who was the bankruptcy judge who heard the Bucy-
rus-Erie bankruptcy, recommended the book to him and asked him to
read it and tell me what he thought. He called me back about six
weeks later and said the book was substantially very accurate about
what went occurred.
So, it's a fascinating case study of how something can really go
wrong if you're not careful in your 201429 disclosures and update them
as soon as you learn of some new information that was out there that
isn't in it. It's also got a very nice historical background on how the
profession ended up with the prevailing fee structure in most bank-
ruptcy cases and big time litigation which is a rather interesting histor-
ical context. It's something every young lawyer ought to read to
realize how serious this can be. The consequences can be utterly dev-
astating if you don't do the right thing at the right time and are found
to have willfully and fraudulently concealed something that should
have should have been disclosed.
MR. TOWBIN: Judge Squires raised an important issue of, given
the preference of claim trading that we have today, and people com-
ing in and out of cases, it seems the rules don't require updated disclo-
sures to be filed, but as a practical matter we all do it. Is there a
particular time that you do a search? Let's say you file a case on Janu-
ary 1st. Is it every quarter? Is it every six weeks? Is it never? Is it
once a year?
MR. ZAZOVE: You're raising a really good question and I think
people look at it from two aspects. One aspect is if another lawyer
joins your law firm, especially our law firm, they go through a very,
very rigorous conflict disclosure process. If we find there is any poten-
tial conflict, not only is the screen set up at the time, but our 201430
statement on file is immediately amended
But that's not really addressing the situation when you live in the
claims trading world. Not only do we live in a claims trading world,
but it's so sophisticated now that creditors holding large claims will
often split up the distribution rights, hold the claim in their name and
the actual parties in interest, maybe four or five other people, and
assign those rights out. So, when one distribution is made that credi-
tor might keep a piece for itself and then divide up the rest; really kind
of like a hedging strategy. We do some work for hedge funds and
that's exactly some of the strategies that they engage in.
29. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
30. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
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So, when we talk about the utility or the advisability of searching
every creditor, every creditor today may not be every creditor to-
morrow. Sometimes I don't know if, Steve, you read the Daily Bank-
ruptcy Review which shows the claims traded. That's sometimes how I
learn if I've got a conflict or not.
MR. TOWBIN: Is it a practice? Do you have something in your
computer that says time to do another conflict search every thirty or
sixty days?
MR. ZAZOVE: Certainly with respect to anybody joining the firm,
but not with respect to the claims. We haven't done that because the
trading is so volatile. It's so difficult. If we know of a situation, of
course we'll disclose it, but I don't know if there's a practice on a
periodic basis to do it.
MR. TOWBIN: Might be something to think about.
MR. ZAZOVE: It is. I just don't know how you monitor it and
provide some sort of a consistent result.
MR. FISHMAN: Judge Squires, do you see regular periodic 201431
updated statements or do you mostly see ones that arise on account of
some identifiable act which causes, perhaps something large happens
and they're aware that they have to add a disclosure? Do you feel like
you get regular, routine updated ones from counsel?
JUDGE SQUIRES: In some cases I do. In most cases I don't. It's
usually in the bigger, more complicated cases where we've got exper-
ienced, sophisticated counsel who take this stuff seriously, that we'll
see the 201432 amended statements or supplemental statements or
whatever. So I know there are people out there that take this
seriously.
The operative word on disclosure is also voluntary disclosure. If
something pops up that you learn about, it's much better that the dis-
closure come from you, the party that has to make the disclosure,
rather than in somebody's motion to vacate the order of retention or
motion to vacate the order on fees because we've just learned that this
professional person has this perceived conflict and they knew about it
and never made a timely disclosure. That was part of Mr. Gellene's
problem.
MR. FISHMAN: This task of keeping your disclosures updated is a
very complicated task. I know we represent a lot of debtors and I
have personally stumbled on this rule a few years back when we filed
a case for a debtor that was related in an ownership sense, but not in a
31. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
32. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
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bankruptcy rule sense, to another entity. We filed the case while the
second case was in front of a different judge. We made all the disclo-
sures in the second case about the first case, but we forgot to go back
and file an amended disclosure in the first case about the second case.
Then somebody who was trying to create some strategic advantage in
the first case became aware of the failure to file the amended disclo-
sure and filed a motion with bad intentions in the first case; alleging
that we were engaged in inappropriate conduct. While fortunately, we
made an amended disclosure and the court was satisfied, it reminded
me just how extensive and complicated this notion of the evolution of
relationships in an existing case can become.
MR. ZAZOVE: We haven't even discussed the real difficult situa-
tion and that is for committee counsel. In my opinion, that is the most
difficult circumstance to stay ahead of because there's so much - you
know, maybe not quite as much now, but the economy had so much
money in it and so many claims were being traded on such a regular
basis. It was very, very, very difficult to keep up with just the volume
of daily claims traded and make disclosures.
In fact, I think prudent committee counsel now indicates in their
application they will make periodic searches, but will only do so either
if something comes to their attention or once an order usually to indi-
cate has been filed. But, it's acute for many counsel and I don't know
what they can do other than try to stay on top of it and know as much
as they can. In fact, it's so difficult that sometimes in cases, wasn't it
the Schwinn33 case where the entire committee turned over?
MR. TOWBIN: Oh, yeah. Well, that's not the first case. Talking
about committee members it's interesting because there's no rules
that say what disclosures committee members have to make. I don't
know if any of you saw this article in the Wall Street Journal last week,
by a professor at the University of Texas, I think named Wu. But, it
was very interesting in that it explained really what the danger is of
conflicts, of committee members sitting on committees who have
credit insurance or are parties to the credit default swaps where
they're hoping the debtor goes down as opposed to sitting there saying
we want to help this reorganization along. You never know if the per-
son sitting next to you, even though they're theoretically a trade credi-
tor, do they hold insurance or do they hold a credit default swap
where they can get paid off in full if that debtor terminates its case or
converts to a Chapter 7.
33. Schwinn Cycling and Fitness, Inc. v. Benonis (In re Schwinn Bicycle Co.), 210 B.R. 747
(Bankr.N.D.Ill.1997).
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There's been issues raised more and more about disclosures that
committee members have to make and I don't think the U.S. Trustee
yet in going through the appointment process in Chapter 11 cases has
really decided what to do or if they're going to do anything at all
about it.
But we just filed a case the beginning of April. We had the commit-
tee formation meeting a couple days ago and there were some very
serious conflicts and I think the U.S. Trustee's office, at least in this
jurisdiction, relies heavily on debtor's counsel to bring to their atten-
tion what the debtor's counsel perceives might be a conflict, or a rea-
son why a committee member should not be seated, or a potential
committee member that should not be seated.
But that is kind of dangerous too because they should be getting
their information from somebody other than the debtor's counsel. I
think there's only going to be a matter of time before people that sit
on committees are going to have to start making full disclosures which
may dissuade people from being committee members. However, I
think in the spirit of transparency, committee members and frankly,
debtor's counsel, should have that information available.
MR. FISHMAN: Well, we're going to run out of time if we don't
keep moving down the outline. Steve made passing reference earlier
in the presentation to conflicts counsel and curing conflicts versus if
you're not disinterested, and how exactly do you get around that. In
our preparatory meeting we talked a little bit about the use of section
327(e) 34 counsel.
So will somebody lay out how this issue arises and then, Judge, I
want to be sure to get your take on which of these kinds of problems
are problems that could be cured and which of these kinds of
problems are simply reasons why we have to get another counsel to
represent the particular party. I'd rather have you guys lay it out and
then have the judge comment.
MR. ZAZOVE: It is rather common in larger cases where gener-
ally one large law firm is representing a debtor that will create for that
law firm multiple conflicts. They'll represent a number of creditors
and not necessarily in unrelated matters and the debtor does not want
to lose the benefit of having their principal counsel; either bankruptcy
counsel or their general corporate counsel.
MR. FISHMAN: Don't you really mean the counsel doesn't want
to lose the benefit of the representation? Isn't that really what drives
this more than the client?
34. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) (2008).
2009]
646 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
MR. ZAZOVE: Then the handcuffs. So the question is, how are
these businesses reconcilable in a bankruptcy case? There are two po-
tential ways that large law firms have dealt with this. One is the appli-
cation and retention of what they call conflicts counsel. It's very
common in New York, as one particular lawyer has made a terrific
living being conflicts counsel in major cases and does an excellent job.
His name is Al Togut, and he's not in a large firm, but I would say
most of the large bankruptcy cases in New York, Togut, Segal & Segal
gets retained as conflicts counsel.
Now, they're also conflicts counsel for the case, it's not just for the
debtor. Sometimes they'll handle conflicts for committee counsel if
there's an equity committee or even counsel for the secured creditors
may have a conflict at various times. So they are called upon to re-
present one side or another in multiple situations.
It is now common in cases that are large enough, we were just talk-
ing about this in the context of General Motors, for each of the con-
stituents to have conflicts counsel. The debtor will have conflicts
counsel, the committee will have conflicts counsel because of certain
confidential things that may go on in the committee where one party
on the committee wants to trade in securities of the debtor, and then
each of the major groups will have a conflicts counsel.
The other alternative, which some people like and I find to be at-
tractive, is representation of special counsel under 327(e). 35 One of
the best cases I ever saw this done was a case before Judge Squires
called National Steel.36 Skadden, Arps had been representing that
company for a long time. They also represented its parent and almost
everybody. Skadden, Arps had irreconcilable conflicts and perhaps
could not have represented the debtor, even with conflicts counsel.
So what they did was farm out everyone but the debtor and then
they retained DLA Piper as general bankruptcy counsel and Skadden,
Arps was retained as special counsel under 327(e) 37 to the debtor.
What did you think of it?
JUDGE SQUIRES: It worked. The other point if you look at Sec-
tion 101(14)(c) 38 is the other prong on retention. Which is, not repre-
senting an interest adverse to the interest of the estate, any class of
creditors or equity security holders by reason of any direct or indirect
relationship to, in connection with, or interest in the debtor or for any
other reason. Well, that can cover anything under the sun. We've
35. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) (2008).
36. In re National Steel Corp., 351 B.R. 906 (N.D.II1.2006).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) (2008).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(c) (2008).
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only been talking about the disinterested part, but don't forget this
other one.
If you take the statute literally, it doesn't work at all because the
estate is, as Dan pointed out, nothing but a receptacle for the time
span of the case to hold property of the estate with which to pay
claims including professional fees and professional persons retained.
A lot of the case law talks about how they can't be representing an
interest that has got some sort of economic adversity. Well, every pro-
fessional wants to get paid out of the estate. So if you're the estate,
you're sitting there as a pot of money potentially and Dan is special
counsel or whatever, he wants to get paid out of the estate. It doesn't
get much more adverse from the estate's perspective than somebody
that wants to take a part of it out to be paid for his or her fees.
So if you literally apply plain meaning of that section, it doesn't
work for anybody. Fortunately, the case law has been a lot more gen-
erous than that and it's again a very ad hoc, fact-based analysis dealing
with the facts and relationships of the particular case at bar in front of
you.
MR. TOWBIN: This raises a disclosure issue because when you do
an application and you have been retained by the debtor pre-petition,
it's important and absolutely necessary to tell the court and the parties
how much you've been paid and when you got paid. If you take a look
at the Pillowtex39 decision in the Third Circuit, you've got a situation
where an accounting firm was disqualified and lost a great deal of
money because they were preference recipients. Believe me, it's very
rare that accounting firms or other professional firms put -forth in their
affidavits they are potential preference recipients. It's just something
that people normally don't point out.
But if you don't point it out, you're going to be held hostage to
people in the case because they're going to say, when your fees come
up, this is what's going to happen. So you want to rethink your posi-
tion on this issue or that issue. It's a dangerous thing for the estate or
a committee to have a professional that is held hostage to somebody
who is going to object to the professional's fees based upon a failure
to disclose. So it's not just a problem for the professional. It's a prob-
lem for the whole case and the bankruptcy system. That's why these
disclosures are just absolutely so important so people aren't put in
that position of being threatened with the loss of their fees because of
failure to properly disclosure.
39. In re Pillowtex, Inc., 349 F.3d 711 (3rd Cir. 2003).
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MR. ZAZOVE: If you take away one thing from this lecture and
speech, it is you should never be the one who decides whether or not
you have a conflict. Your obligation as a professional is to make the
disclosures and let someone else make that determination. The better
your disclosures, the safer you are in the long run. In my experience,
I've never seen any circumstance where the proper disclosures were
made that someone, even if they came in later and objected, that a
court would cognize that objection. You're either going to do it at the
beginning of the case or you're not. You cannot lie in the weeds and
attempt to exert undue influence later.
You can represent that you have no conflict, but it's not your deci-
sion to make. Your obligation as a professional is to make every pos-
sible disclosure that you can and let someone else check. Doing that
at the beginning of the case is far better than the consequences of
omitting something and having to deal with it later.
MR. FISHMAN: Let's talk about that exact scenario because I
think that's a very good point that you made. A particular law firm
seeking to be retained under section 327(a), to be general bankruptcy
counsel to a particular bankruptcy estate, files its retention motion
and its 2014 affidavit. In that affidavit it discloses as a connection a
relationship with a creditor that constitutes an actual conflict of inter-
est in the case. There's a companion motion filed by the debtor seek-
ing to retain a second law firm to represent the estate with respect to
the matter implicated by that actual conflict of interest.
In practice, it appears in many courts the first lawyer will be allowed
to be retained under 327(a), 40 and the second lawyer will be retained
as conflicts counsel to handle the matter which constitutes the conflict.
My question is, under the rule how does retaining somebody as con-
flicts counsel cure the fact that you are not disinterested and that you
represent an interest adverse to the estate? How do you make that go
away, thereby allowing yourself to be retained under 327(a) 41 simply
by retaining conflicts counsel?
MR. ZAZOVE: You're the guy that said that your obligation is to
disclose and let the court decide whether or not an actual conflict ex-
ists or not.
MR. FISHMAN: Maybe I'm asking the court.
JUDGE SQUIRES: I disclaim all advisory opinions sought.
MR. FISHMAN: Look, I've heard you do this before. Pretend like
you're a judge.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2008).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2008).
[Vol. 7:627
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST
MR. TOWBIN: Why don't we ask the real judge?
JUDGE SQUIRES: It's all fact specific. I can't prejudge any of
this stuff until I know what all the facts and circumstances are. But if
a professional person is not both statutorily disinterested and not rep-
resenting an interest adverse to the estate, they're not supposed to be
retained.
MR. FISHMAN: How does conflict counsel ever cure that prob-
lem? The only reason you would ask for conflicts counsel is if the
existence of a set of facts creates a problem which you believe gets in
the way of you being retained in the absence of conflict counsel.
MR. ZAZOVE: Bob, I'm not sure. Let me give you a little better
answer. There are different types of conflicts. I might represent a
debtor and ultimately find that someone buys a claim in the case, who
winds up being a client of mine at a subsequent point in time. I can
tell you from firsthand experience this has happened and it's the cli-
ent's purchase of that claim that can create a conflict during that time
frame. In that circumstance, whether or not special counsel can han-
dle any controversy with that creditor will resolve that situation.
MR. FISHMAN: You would be then talking about something that
would be a potential for a conflict because unless and until a contro-
versy arises between the debtor and that new holder of the claim,
there is no actual conflict that exists.
MR. ZAZOVE: Let me create a couple hypotheticals for the other
members of the panel. Steve brought up a good situation where a
particular law firm might represent a bank or another lending institu-
tion. The matter would be completely unrelated. They have a bank-
ing relationship. They have no conflict waiver because it's very hard
to get prospective waivers. You have to go and request an individual
waiver from that client.
Let's assume that that client constitutes five percent or more of the
revenues for that law firm; which does happen on occasion as well.
Do you have, in that case a reconcilable conflict, a disqualifying
conflict?
MR. TOWBIN: It depends on the judge. There's a judge in the
Northern District that said that five percent of your business is going
to disqualify you.
MR. FISHMAN: Aren't we mixing words again? We've got all
these words that often get interchangeably used, but they're not the
same words. We have connection, conflict, disinterested, and holds an
adverse interest. Those things are not interchangeable.
MR. TOWBIN: Holds or represents an adverse interest.
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MR. FISHMAN: That's correct. I wrote it down. So the question
is, the statute says you must be disinterested and whether you avoid
under applicable state ethics rules a conflict may satisfy that rule, but
what does it do to address the disinterestedness test which isn't com-
pletely the equivalent of a conflict?
MR. ZAZOVE: Hypothetically, let's assume that you've repre-
sented that lending institution in an unrelated matter once. Does that
mean that you are interested or disinterested? Should that disqualify
you from representing a debtor who has an adversity with that lending
institution?
MR. FISHMAN: I get to ask the question. You have to answer.
MR. ZAZOVE: I was hoping if I asked that one you would answer.
JUDGE SQUIRES: Isn't that basically 327(c)? That provides that
in a case under Chapter 7, 12, or 11, a person is not disqualified from
employment under this section solely because of such person's em-
ployment by or representation of a creditor, unless there is an objec-
tion by another creditor for the United States Trustee. In which case,
the court shall disapprove such employment if there is an actual con-
flict of interest.
Again actual conflict of interest is not a defined term so a lot of this
stuff just goes under my judicial radar because it may be out there as
long as it's disclosed. If nobody is going to object, being another cred-
itor or the UST, I'm not going to make issue of it sua sponte. I don't
know what the hell is going on until parties tell me.
MR. TOWBIN: That 327(c) 42 has also been used where the same
attorney wants to represent multiple debtors that file jointly adminis-
tered cases. Often today you'll see Chapter 11 being filed by a corpo-
rate group of entities where you've got ten or fifteen different entities
and there's inter-company guarantees or inter-company claims. Obvi-
ously it's not going to be financially feasible to hire twelve different
lawyers for the twelve different companies. You're not going to have
twelve different committees, although interestingly, the bankruptcy
code says there shall be a committee in each case. But nobody really
takes that very seriously.
MR. FISHMAN: That's case with a small C.
MR. TOWBIN: But the point is that 327,43 1 think, has been appro-
priately used for getting around the fact where you've got multiple
debtors represented by the same lawyer, even though there might be
inter-company claims, that's not going to disqualify you. For the most
42. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) (2008).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2008).
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part, those inter-company claims are not disputed and generally in a
plan they're going to be resolved in one form or another anyway.
I think courts sensibly use 327(c) 44 in those situations and I don't
think I've seen in the 35 years I've practiced, a law firm get objected
to representing multiple debtors because of inter-company claims who
are not disinterested.
AUDIENCE: You posed the question about conflicts counsel and
so now I'm a little confused. My understanding of conflicts counsel
was that an attorney could come in and independently research to de-
termine if, in fact, there was an actual conflict and report to the court;
not a curative.
MR. FISHMAN: I think the term is ordinarily used not - I mean
that's sort of like the court's expert concept. I think that in general
practice conflicts counsel is, for instance, if I represent a debtor and
one of the debtor's principal unsecured creditors is a large client of my
firm who I don't represent with respect to anything related to the
debtor. That creditor who is a client of my firm, who I could not com-
mence a lawsuit against. Now let's suppose that that client received a
preference in that bankruptcy case. The notion of conflicts counsel
would be I would retain Dan to bring the preference action against my
client in the bankruptcy case on behalf of the bankruptcy estate and I
would have no involvement at all in the dispute between the estate
and my client on that preference matter. That's the context in which
conflicts counsel is being used.
JUDGE SQUIRES: That's really 327(e) 45 so don't call it that, just
call it counsel for a specified purpose.
AUDIENCE: If there had been a special conflict at the inception
of the engagement and someone objected, you couldn't get past
327(C) 4 6 because someone would have objected.
MR. FISHMAN: I think that's probably right. If my debtor client
and my other client were actually engaged in a real dispute at that
time and worse yet, if I had some involvement with that dispute
before I began representing the debtor, I don't believe disclosure,
conflicts counsel, 327(c) or (e) 4 7 will get me past the fact that I can't
represent that debtor as 327(a) counsel.
MR. ZAZOVE: But you will generally see the retention of con-
flicts counsel occur at the same time that the case is filed with the first
day motions even though that might have to wait the 20 days as well.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) (2008).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) (2008).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) (2008).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c), (e) (2008).
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But it is generally thought that conflicts counsel is selected very early
on and identified because that conflicts counsel has to do his or her
own conflicts check as well.
MR. FISHMAN: You need conflicts counsel for conflicts counsel.
MR. TOWBIN: By the way, there's a limitation on 327(e), 48 which
a lot of courts ignore, of conflicts counsel or 327(e)49 special counsel
must have represented the debtor pre-petition. How many times have
you seen a motion by counsel for the debtor, by the debtor in posses-
sion, we're going to hire committee counsel to do some conflict work
in the case. Well, they didn't represent the debtor pre-petition and
under 327(e). 50 There's a split of authority. It's in the materials. We
can see the split of authority, but some courts take that very seriously.
As 327(e) 51 was intended, if you had somebody, a non-bankruptcy
lawyer, handling matters for you pre-petition who you want to con-
tinue to retain post-petition and you don't want to make him waive his
claim so he's not a creditor.
MR. ZAZOVE: What's the difference between 327(e) 52 and what
is called ordinary course professionals?
MR. TOWBIN: 327(e) 53 requires disclosure and that you can't
have an adverse interest in the estate. But 327(b),54 ordinary course
counsel, is where you have in-house counsel at the time the case is
filed or in-house attorneys, accountants or other kind of professionals.
You do not need to go to court to get them retained. The debtor in
possession, without regards to the disclosure requirements, can con-
tinue to retain and more importantly compensate those people in the
ordinary course of business.
JUDGE SQUIRES: But they have to be employees as stated in
327(b).55
MR. ZAZOVE: In the National Steel56 case I believe there was an
order, or motion presented to authorize the debtor to retain outside
professionals as ordinary course as long as they were not involved. I
know we see it all the time.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) (2008).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 327(b) (2008).
55. Id.
56. In re National Steel Corp., 351 B.R. 906.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST
JUDGE SQUIRES: Right. The way to deal with that is if they've
got this title problem, as in Clark Retail,57 where you have real estate
in multiple states all over the country, and the client wants to use local
counsel to close a real estate deal. I think the order provided you
didn't have to go through the separate application process. However,
before they can do any work they've got to make a 201458 disclosure
of record and then let the chips fall where they may.
MR. FISHMAN: On that note, we have to bring to conclusion our
presentation because we have overstayed our welcome. So thank you
everybody very much.
57. In re Clark Retail Enter., Inc., 308 B.R. 869.
58. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014.
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